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ABSTRACT
 Through what mediums is it possible to spread status? Prior research shows that 
status can be inferred from reward states, status and expectations can spread from one 
valued characteristic to another, and that differences in the status value of an object 
possessed by an individual can lead to differences in power during exchange interactions. 
However, it is not known if possession of these objects actually results in increased status 
and expectations for an individual possessing the status valued object. Building on Status 
Value Theory, Status Construction Theory, Reward Expectations Theory, and the Status 
Value Theory of Power, I construct a theoretical extension to Status Value Theory that 
proposes that objects are able to temporarily transfer status via possession. 
In this thesis I lay out the theoretical extension, referred to as the Possession of 
Status Value Theory, and provide results from an experiment done on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk platform. Results provide partial support for the theory, showing that 
the status value of objects possess by high status others is acknowledge by future 
recipients of a status valued object. However, status value transfers only when the 
participant possesses the high status valued object, and expectations transfer only when 
their partner is possesses the high status valued object. In addition, low status valued 
objects seem to have a floor effect for how little status value they contain and how low 
the expectations individuals have for themselves and others can fall because of 
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possession. The thesis concludes with a discussion of these findings, proposing 3 possible 
explanations for the results, and future directions for this research.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Can possession of an object lead to greater or lesser status for an individual? 
Status, often thought of as prestige or honor, is a primary line of categorization for human 
interaction. Humans use it to select leaders (Berger et al. 1977; Ridgeway and Berger 
1986), distribute resources (Berger et al. 19851), and influence each other (Berger et al. 
1977). In fact, status is even considered when forming reciprocal friendships (Frank 
1985; Ball and Newman 2013) and selecting romantic partners (McPherson et al. 2001). 
Previous research has indicated that the value of objects an individual possesses is also 
influenced by their status (Thye 2000; Thye and Harrell 2016). However, in this study I 
am interested in the reverse, does possession of an object lead to greater or lesser status 
for an individual? 
We know that humans use objects in everyday life to expressive themselves. 
Objects can be used as tokens for an individual to demonstrate something not physically 
observable, be that status (Fisek et al. 2005), characteristics or attributes not externally 
seen (Fisek et al. 2005), or illustrations of our identity, personality, or character (Sliver 
1996). However, it is still unclear if status is actually gained from possession of these 
objects. Assuming that individuals do gain status from possession, it is unknown if 
possession of a status valued object would behave similarly to possession of a 
characteristic. In addition, we know little about how status value, both positive and 
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negative, transfers from individuals to objects, or from interaction to interaction, and over 
long periods of time. 
The ability for objects to confer status or other attributions to an individual is not 
a new line of theory or inquiry. Thorstein Veblen discusses this phenomenon at the turn 
of the 20th century, presenting a theory claiming that Americans chase spending trends of 
upper class individuals in order to present themselves as higher in social class (Veblen 
1899). Veblen’s illustration of this specifically focuses on Middle Class Americans and 
their willingness to spend large amounts of money to imitate spending habits of higher 
social classes, often purchasing clothing, taking vacations, and participating in leisure 
activities that are common among upper class individuals. Veblen also proposes that, 
over time, this actually causes upper class cultural trends to become more extreme or 
change to different practices in order to further distinguish themselves from the middle 
class.  
More recently, Sociological Social Psychologists have become interested in 
objects and the effects of their possession. They have found that that possession of higher 
status characteristics in an exchange interaction increase the exchange value of objects 
these individuals hold (Thye 2000; Thye and Harrell 2016). Although these studies 
typically look at characteristics of an individual, such as age, sex, and education, the 
resulting theories they use do lend important concepts and insights into if and how 
objects are increasing an individual’s status.  
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Does possession of a status valued object confer status to those that possess it? 
And does the conferred status provide expectations for performance that are similar to 
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those we could normally expect from possessing a status characteristic? Status, in these 
research questions, is defined as perceived prestige or honor (Berger et al. 1977). A status 
valued object refers to an object that has worth, prestige, or honor attached to it (Thye 
2000; Thye and Harrell 2016). For example, Stradivarius Violins, Italian Violins crafted 
by members of the Stradivarius family, are highly prized by collectors and musicians. 
This common preference is derived from their association with the Stradivarius family 
and their reputation for producing high quality string instruments, a as well as from 
repetitive possession by high preforming violin players. However, although the 
instruments are highly prized, there is no evidence that they are superior to modern 
violins in sound quality, ease of use, or any other objective criterion (Belluck 2014). 
Instead, theses violins seem to be prized because they have accumulated status value. The 
possessor of such an instrument is viewed as having attained higher status purely by 
virtue of possession. Indeed, possessing a Stradivarius instrument conveys status 
somewhat independently of the means used to acquire it, as both purchasing an 
instrument outright or being loaned such an instrument by its owner convey status to the 
holder. Thus, the value of a Stradivarius instrument derives primarily from the impact it 
has on one’s status, rather than from anything intrinsic to the instrument itself. 
Often objects, such as the Stradivarius violin, take a substantial amount of 
resources or effort to obtain. This amount of effort and resources used to obtain one is 
typically considered a signal of their value to the individual and they are expected to be a 
reflection of the individuals status and influence (Veblen 1899). And this does not only 
extend to objects, as individuals will also spend large amounts of resources to be 
associated with high status others or be a part of high status groups (Frank 1985).  In 
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addition, these objects may serve as a signal to others of some unobserved or not 
immediately notable trait, a kind of ability, position of importance or legitimacy, or an 
amount of power.  
Signaling behaviors have also been studied in other contexts. Research in both 
Biology and Economics have used these concepts under the label of Costly Signaling 
Theory (Spence 1973), which proposes that individuals and groups use their resources or 
characteristics to signal their power, competence, and willingness to cooperate. In order 
to display such costly behavior signals, the resources available must already be abundant 
for the waste to be sustainable. This abundance indicates already present power and 
ability. Examples include work on resource exchange situations in which individuals gift 
resources they hold to signal trustworthy behavior, hoping to get better exchange deals in 
future interactions (Gintis et al. 2001; Fehr and Gächter 2002). There is also research that 
similar traits are used by non-human species to find mates (Searcy and Nowicki 2005). In 
effect, there is precedent for thinking of objects as mechanisms for signaling status or 
ability to others, and this exists across many domains of inquiry.
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
To understand the concept of status value and its operationalization, I will review 
a selection of major theories from the Expectation States Research Program. In addition 
to this, I will also review the concepts of status and power as they are presented in the 
Status Value Theory of Power. The Expectation States Research Program is concerned 
with how expectations are created for individuals involved in collective interactions and 
how these expectations shape hierarchies of status and prestige. There are four theories 
from the Expectation States Research Program that apply directly to this work. They are 
Status Characteristics Theory, Reward Expectations Theory, Status Construction Theory, 
and Status Value Theory. 
Status Characteristics Theory (hereafter SCT) is a branch of the Expectation 
States Research Program that is used to explain the formation of status hierarchies in 
groups and the expectations that form around them (Berger et al. 1972; Berger et al. 
1974; Berger et al. 19852). The theory proposes that performance expectations are 
formed from differences in status between individuals (Berger et al. 1977). Performance 
expectations themselves are beliefs about how an individual possessing certain 
characteristics will perform. These expectations are shaped by an Observable Power and 
Prestige Order (hereafter OPPO), a hierarchy that is ordered by individuals’ status 
relevant to the rest of their group and reflects expectations for performance. The OPPOs 
are typically noticed and enforced by specific behaviors, such as deference, difference in 
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performance opportunities, differences in rewards for performance, and increased 
likelihood of holding leadership positions. 
OPPOs are formed from Status Characteristics, which are attributes that form 
around differences in cognitions and evaluations (Berger et al. 1977; Berger et al. 2015). 
These characteristics possess status value, which confer status onto an individual that 
possesses them, and can be one of two different types, diffuse and specific. Diffuse Status 
Characteristics are attributes an individual possesses that are positively or negatively 
evaluated; they are perceived as instrumental to a task, and carry performance 
expectations that generalize to a larger social setting. Examples such as race, age, and 
education would be considered diffuse characteristics. Specific Status Characteristics are 
similar to diffuse, except their evaluations are not generalizable in a larger social setting. 
Characteristics such as math, writing, and woodworking ability would be considered 
specific characteristics. However, characteristics that an individual possesses are not the 
only thing that contributes to the formation of expectations. Some characteristics are not 
visible or salient in interactions but can be brought up and made salient through the use of 
Status Cues, including styles of dress, speech, or behavior that are used to infer a Status 
Characteristic (Fisek et al. 2005). Examples of this would be a college class ring as an 
indicator of education or an expensive watch as an indicator of income. 
Characteristics not only influence expectations and an individual’s position in a 
hierarchy of their peers, they also have a strong influence on the distribution of rewards 
to group members and how rewards are expected to be distributed in a wider social 
context. Reward Expectations Theory deals specifically with this phenomenon, studying 
how interactions between characteristics and expectations influence the distribution of 
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goal objects. These can be positions, privileges, and resources or physical objects that can 
be exchanged (Berger et al. 19851). Goal objects are typically distributed by referential 
structures, which are socially legitimate sets of principles that designate how goal objects 
should be distributed (Berger et al. 1977; Berger et al. 2014), and are typically based on 
salient characteristics, such as race and gender (Ridgeway and Berger 1986). The process 
of reward allocation can also confirm status. This is done by an individual with no 
information on another’s status characteristics or how those characteristics are 
interoperated in a wider social context. Reward Expectations Theory proposes the people 
infer the referential structure that caused that distribution of rewards from visible 
attributes, such as status characteristics. They then infer the status and expectations 
attached to characteristics from that structure (Cook 1975; Berger et al. 1977; Berger et 
al. 2014). This is often referred to as the reverse process, and is vital as a mechanism for 
theories that propose paths or discuss ways in which status characteristics are created. 
There are two proposed methods by which status characteristics are created, 
doubly dissimilar encounters and diffusion from existing characteristics, both of which 
use some form of the reverse inference process described above. Status Construction 
Theory utilizes the process of doubly dissimilar encounters, in which at least two 
individuals interact on some task, while also possessing different levels of a nominal 
characteristic and goal objects or resources (Ridgeway 1991, 2000; Ridgeway and 
Erickson 2000; Webster and Hysom 1998). Over time these interactions form 
expectations for levels of the nominal characteristic and are spread to others through 
interaction with individuals that were in the original doubly dissimilar encounter, or 
through explicit teaching of the expectations. 
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Status Value Theory (or Diffusion of Status Value Theory) is a response to Status 
Construction Theory and proposes that status and expectations can spread between an 
existing status characteristic and a nominal characteristic if both are possessed by the 
same individual (Berger and Fisek 2006). Similar to Status Construction Theory, 
repetitive interactions cause status and expectations to be transferred from one 
characteristic to another, creating value for those characteristics. Following this transfer, 
the new status characteristic can then stand on its own and is used in future interactions to 
imply status, expectations, and rewards (Berger and Fisek 2006). In addition to status 
spreading to nominal characteristics, the theory goes a step further and proposes that 
status and expectations can also spread to objects. Once the status value is of the object is 
successfully established it can be legitimated from repetitive behavioral affirmation in the 
general population (Ridgeway and Berger 1986, Zelditch and Floyd 1998). Numerous 
studies and a computer simulation have shown that both types of interactions will foster 
status beliefs (Ridgeway 1998; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000; Ridgeway and Balkwell 
1997; Walker et al. 2011). Regardless of the mechanism, as the beliefs about the 
characteristics spread into the larger population, they will tend to achieve consensus 
acceptance. This is because those using them think of these beliefs as legitimate ways to 
infer expectations, status, and rewards (Zelditch and Floyd 1998; Kalkhoff 2005; 
Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2000). 
In addition to differences in the status and expectations between levels of a status 
characteristic, there may also be differences in exchange power. The Status Value Theory 
of Power joins together ideas from the Expectation States literature, as well as theories on 
power and exchange. It predicts that individuals in possession of higher valued status 
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characteristics will also have an increase in the value of their exchangeable resources, 
regardless of the actual monetary value of the resources. This in turn would give 
individuals with greater status more power in exchange relationships, allowing them to be 
more selective when picking exchange partners, and demanding more in exchange for 
their resources (Thye 2000). Additional studies have found that this increase in exchange 
power also provides greater influence outside of the exchange relationship (Thye, Willer, 
and Markovsky 2006). 
A series of experiments have confirmed these predictions, showing that higher 
status individuals are able to extract more resources from lower status partners in 
exchange for resources they possess (Thye 2000). In addition, a recent study manipulated 
the number of salient characteristics differentiating individuals (one vs. multiple) and the 
distinctness of resources (same colored objects vs. different colored objects). They found 
that reducing the number of status characteristics distinguishing actors to a single 
characteristic still supported the initial theory (Thye and Harrell 2016). In support of 
status value’s connection to more abstract concepts, Harkness (2017) found that 
differences in reward levels, the amount one is compensated for a task, behave similarly 
to status characteristics and are used to infer expectations. 
2.1 STATUS VALUE IN THE EXPECTATION STATES PROGRAM 
Connecting all of these theories is the concept of status value. Status value is 
present in the formation of status hierarchies (Berger et al. 1977), in the characteristics 
found in doubly dissimilar encounters (Ridgeway 1991, 2000), and in the diffusion of 
status from a valued status characteristic to a nominal characteristic (Berger and Fisek 
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2006). All of these situations incorporate status value by either creating status value for a 
characteristic, or from the inference made through referential structures. 
SCT and Reward Expectations Theory interprets status value as the abstract worth 
that society gives to an object or personal characteristics (Berger et al. 1977; Berger et al. 
2015; Berger et al. 19851). For a diffuse characteristic this is fairly straightforward; it is 
interpreted as salient during all interactions and has a concrete value structure associated 
with it to infer how an individual will perform at certain tasks. For a specific 
characteristic this is different, as the relevance of the characteristic does not generalize 
beyond a specific set of interactions (Berger et al. 1977). This also means that the status 
value and expectations for such a characteristic would be restricted to the same set of 
interactions. For example, individuals with high musical ability are not also assumed to 
be highly intelligent. 
Reward Expectations Theory applies these concepts a bit differently. For Reward 
Expectations Theory status value is applied to reward allocation and valuation of goal 
objects distributed after a task is completed. Those in possession of high states of a status 
characteristic are expected to perform better at a task and contribute more. Because of 
this they are adequately compensated for their expected performance, which is tied to the 
status value of their characteristics. However, often goal objects are distributed before 
performance expectations are known to observers or future individuals that will be in a 
similar interaction. In these cases, instead of allocating goal objects by the expectations 
that come from an individual’s characteristics, the reverse is done. Expectations are 
inferred by the rewards an individual possesses with the assumption that they are 
indicators of ability. In this reverse process, the rewards already allocated indicate the 
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status value of the characteristics an individual possesses (Berger et al. 1972; Berger et al. 
1998). By using knowledge from an observed situation as a referential structure and the 
individuals involved as referential actors, it is assumed that similar others will also have 
the same allocation of resources, abilities, and expectations. 
Status Construction Theory and Status Value Theory focus on the creation of 
status value. Status Construction Theory does this via doubly dissimilar encounters 
(Ridgeway 1991, 2000). Status Value Theory proposes that, in addition to doubly 
dissimilar encounters, the existence of a status valued characteristic and nominal 
characteristic by the same individual would be enough for status value to spread from one 
characteristic to the other via association (Berger and Fisek 2006, 2013). In both of these 
theories it is the presence of a difference in resources, or already valued characteristics 
and the presence of a nominal characteristic, which creates and spreads status value. The 
actual possession of a status valued object as the differing factor has not been 
theoretically or experimentally explored. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POSSESSION OF STATUS VALUE THEORY
We know a great deal about status and characteristics or items associated with 
status. Literature proposes and tests many theories on status’s creation, it spread, and its 
effects on interactions (Webster and Walker 2017). However, in Veblen’s discussion of 
the concept of Conspicuous Consumption, it is proposed that possession of a status 
valued object brings an individual status, along with power and legitimacy in their social 
position (Veblen 1899). We know that individuals will spend large amounts of money 
and effort to possess objects they feel are associated with their status in society or the 
status of higher social classes and that these behaviors also occur at the micro level 
within group interactions. However, questions relating to gaining status, especially 
temporarily, from possession of a status valued object have not been answered. 
To answer these questions, I propose an extension to Status Value Theory that 
focuses on object value, possession, and transfer. Based on previous work, it seems likely 
that status valued objects can be used to distinguish individuals in terms of status and 
expectations. In this instance object are used as a reference for expected status and 
expectations, is similar to the reverse process outlined in Reward Expectations Theory. 
And allows status and expectations to be attached to an object instead of an individual. 
Formally, I propose that a status valued object acquires status in the initial 
interaction which it is part of, and that the status value attached to the object can be 
temporarily gifted to an individual possessing the object. When an individual is 
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possessing a status valued object, is serves as a reference to a referential structure that 
was created during an observed interaction. This would be expected to increase their 
overall status regardless of existing status characteristics. The increase in overall status 
would also increase their performance expectations that individual holds for themselves, 
and others hold for them. However, once the object is no longer in their possession the 
reference to the referential structure is also removed, resetting their status and 
expectations to levels similar to before possession of the object. 
This process of temporary possession could be continued with new individuals 
possessing the object and being gifted status and associated expectations through 
possession of the object. In addition to this, I propose that it is possible not only for high 
status value, but also low status value to spread from an object to an individual. Similar to 
the process described above, we would expect an individual with a low status valued 
object to have their status decreased along with their expectations. 
The proposed extension focuses on situations that involve at least two 
interactions, complete turnover in actors participating in the interaction, and salience of 
an object and its status value. Actors infer status value from observation of others, 
treating them as referential actors (Berger et al. 1998). Beyond this state, the status value 
of an object should be able to transfer status to new situations on its own, without the 
need of a diffuse or specific characteristic as long as the status value and a reference to its 
creation is salient. Markovsky, Berger, and Smith (1984) demonstrate that status 
interventions persist across task situations and interactants, with a decay function over 
time. I assume the same mechanisms would be true for this theory. 
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 These outcomes are expected to happen if the conditions under which an object 
initially gains status value are known to those interacting with the object as possessors 
and observers of an interaction. In other words, if objects are present in an interaction 
which is not made public to other individuals, then the object cannot be expected to 
spread status and expectations to others. We would also not expect the object to spread 
status and expectations if it is not valued by observers of the initial interaction, as they 
would have no reason to care about and keep track of the object. This could be because 
the object is not unique enough to be noticed, or because its notoriety gets lost in multiple 
other stimuli occurring in an interaction. 
In addition to this there are several scope conditions for this theory. First, it is 
expected that there are at least two distinct objects possessed by different individuals. 
This is needed to make the comparison between situations as equal as possible, as lack of 
an object by one actor would create a difference that is not the focus on the theoretical 
mechanism. For example, an instance where one actor has an object and another does not, 
could accidently indicate status or value related to an attribute of the individual instead of 
the object. Although this does not mean that the objects can’t be the same thing, such as 
two violins, they must be distinguishable. Second, actors are differentiated only by the 
object that they possess. Third, actors in the initial interaction perform differently on a 
task in a way that is salient and severe enough to create different expectations for future 
performance. In other words, it is expected that one actor does quite well at a task 
compared to another. A formal theory section with clear layouts of each proposition and 
derivation, definitions, and a theory diagram is included in the appendix. 
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3.1 HYPOTHESIS 
To test the initial parts of this theory, specifically the ability of status value and 
expectations to spread to an object and back to an individual, I propose the following 
hypotheses.  
 
H1: Observed differences in an interaction between two referential actors in which one 
preforms better than the other will increase the status value of objects held by the high 
preforming actor. 
H2: Possession of a high status valued object will increase an actor’s status during a 
collectively oriented task. 
H3: Actors in possession of high status valued objects will have higher performance 
expectations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS
This study uses a 4-condition experimental design. The design results in two 
conditions in which the status of the valued objects was equated, and two conditions in 
which the status of the valued object was not equated. In these unequal conditions, one 
assigns the participant the high status object, and the other assigns their partner with the 
high status object. See table 4.1 for an illustration. 
Table 4.1 Conditions 
  Actor object value 
  Low Status Value High Status Value 
Other Object 
Value 
Low Status 
Value 
Condition 1 Condition 3 
High Status 
Value 
Condition 2 Condition 4 
The high and low status valued objects used in this experiment are geometric 
shapes and symbols obtained from a free online icon library (https://www.iconsdb.com/). 
These shapes and symbols are referred to as avatars during the study and will henceforth 
be referred to by the same term. The avatars were pretested as part of a set of 20 to select 
the ones that were the most similar and most attractive to a sample population. The goal 
was to select the avatars that had the highest attractiveness and were the most similar in 
terms of their rating. It was expected that this would lead to avatars that are rated as 
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similar in terms of attractiveness during typical interactions. To decide which were the 
most similar, a short pilot study was conducted to norm the avatars, illustrating the 
baseline attractiveness for each. In the end, four avatars were selected. These were the 
aperture, sun, light, and eye avatars. The final avatars are shown in figure 4.1. The sun 
and aperture avatars were selected as status valued objects. Additional information about 
the norming study, including detailed methods and the results, are provided in the 
appendix. In addition to the norming study, a study pilot using the same population was 
carried out before putting the study online to make sure all aspects of the study 
functioned as intendent. 
  
  
Figure 4.1 Final Study Avatars 
Before the study launched, changes were made to allow for counterbalancing of 
avatars used as status valued objects. This meant that when some participants took the 
study, the sun avatar was the high status valued object. When others participated, the 
aperture was. This was done to ensure that the mechanism being tested was the actual 
spread of status value instead of personal attachment to the avatars or preference for a 
geometric shape or pattern. 
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Significant differences are found between the video versions created for 
counterbalancing. Individuals in the video version which the aperture avatar was using as 
the high status avatar reported a higher mean on the Status Value scale when rating the 
observed interaction, indicating that the aperture avatar was valued more than the sun 
avatar by participants. However, when comparing between the low status avatars it is 
found that this video version also has its low status avatar, in this case the sun avatars, 
rated as higher compared to the other video version. Taking this into account, both 
avatars are rated as having greater status value in this video version. The actual 
differences between high and low status avatars in both video versions are insignificant, 
leading to the conclusion that counterbalancing had no additional effects other than 
isolating the mechanisms of interest. 
The experiment was carried out using Qualtrics, a popular survey and vignette 
experiment platform. Participants for the experiment were recruited using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (hereafter mTurk), a worker recruitment website that is actively used 
for both simple programing or transcription tasks and research1. A total of 192 
participants are included in the study, 48 in each condition. The number of responses 
collected was around 204. However, drops were made because some individuals failed 
suspicion checks, and additional drops were made to equate cell sizes for conditions2. All 
                                                             
1 During data collection mTurk had a verification issue in which individuals were able to take studies using 
the same IP address if they switched mTurk accounts, effectively getting around ballot box stuffing 
measures put in place by Qualtrics. Although the issue has been patched, this did increase the drop rate for 
this study. After the second wave of data collection the issue was noticed and if an IP address was found to 
be the same as an earlier one then the participant was dropped from the dataset and they were not paid for 
additional attempts to take the study. Instead they were sent a message manually through the mTurk 
website that informed them that their IP address was already attached to a previous response to the study 
and that they are only able to participate once. 
2 Drops were made to equate all conditions to the condition with the fewest observations. This was 
condition 4, which had 48 observations. To equate conditions: 5 observations were dropped from condition 
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drops to equate condition sizes were done using a random number generator that 
generated an ID number from those available in the overrepresented condition. 
The experiment was divided into two parts. The first part introduced the avatars, 
the task, and the scales used to rate performance. The avatars were introduced as a status 
valued object via a video. This video was introduced as being from a previous interaction 
between two individuals that had taken the study. It was noted that during the previous 
interaction the only thing distinguishing them is their possession of an aperture or sun 
avatar. During the interaction observed in the video the prior participants carried out a 
Relational Ability Task. This task has individuals view the possible verbal pronunciation 
of a word and try to match it with one of two symbols from an ancient language to that 
pronunciation. In reality there are no right answers to the task, but participants are led to 
believe there are. 
Participants are informed that they will be carrying out the same task and will be 
identified through possession of one of the same avatars they observe, the other of which 
will be given to a partner. Participants are then asked a series of comprehension check 
questions to ensure they understood the Relational Ability Task. In order to continue they 
are required to correctly answer 4 out of the 5 comprehension check questions. Failure to 
do so results in a message informing the participant that they are unable to continue 
because they have not demonstrated that they adequately understand the task. Following 
this, they view the video of the previous interaction and are asked to indicate which 
avatar they would like to possess for the next part of the study if they were given a 
                                                             
1, 6 were dropped from condition 2, and 1 was dropped from condition 3. Equal cell sizes were desired to 
run accurate ANOVA’s. 
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choice. They then completed a series of ratings to obtain their perspective on how they 
viewed the previous interactants and their avatars as status valued objects. 
The second part of the study had participants carry out 5 practice rounds of the 
Relational Ability task, followed by adaptations of the two previous Likert scales asking 
them to rate their expected performance and the expected performance of their partner 
during the Relational Ability Task. Before the practice rounds individuals were given 
another set of directions and comprehension checks. Like the first set, passing 4 out of 
the 5 questions was required to continue in the study. 
The practice rounds differed from the rounds observed in the video in two ways. 
First, a score was not kept. This was to make performance ambiguous, encouraging 
inference from the knowledge individuals had about each other, which in this case was 
only the difference in avatars possessed by the individual. Second, the partner that 
participants were paired with was actually a simulated other which was preprogramed to 
disagree with them on 4 out of the 5 practice rounds. 
After the practice rounds participants filled out adaptations of the first two Likert 
scales, along with the additional status and ability items that were asked during the first 
part of the study. These adaptations asked participants to make assessments of 
performance expectations for themselves and their partners as well as and the status value 
of the objects that they possessed. Following these ratings participants were asked to 
provide additional information about themselves. This information included 
demographics, as well as suspicion checks and additional items to see if the participants 
had seen the geometric patterns and shapes before. Around 26% reported that they had 
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seen these avatars outside of the study, with the most common location of the avatars 
being video games, specifically smart phone games and the computer game Portal. 
Although this did not seem to have any effect on the interpretation or ranking of the 
avatars outside of the experimental manipulation. 
After demographics were collected, participants were debriefed and thanked for 
their participation. The mTurk website handled all pay, recruitment, and work rejection 
procedures, in addition to record keeping and communication between myself and the 
participants if it was needed. 
4.1 VARIABLES 
Variables for this study included measures of general performance expectations 
from a scale created by Zeller and Warnecke (1973), measures of status value from the 
Status Value Scale (Thye 2000), and single Likert scale questions asking about perceived 
ability at similar tasks, general ability, and individual status. In addition to these items 
were single questions on how luck effected their perspectives of performance and how 
feelings of control effect their perspectives of performance. For the first part of the study 
these questions were asked to participants about observed individuals. For the second part 
of the study participants were asked to answer the questions with relation to themselves 
and their partner. 
The Zeller and Warnecke scale was used to rate general expectations for 
performance and competency. The scale itself is made up of nine Likert scale items that 
are used to rate: expected performance (e.g., better at or able to perform a task), 
intelligence, worth, industriousness, superiority, ability, and morality. All of these items 
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were done on a 1-7 scale. The scales alpha is .93. During analysis a simple factor loading 
was performed on this scale to see if it contained different components. This was done 
because the original literature proposed that there are three unique factors that items of 
this scale load onto (Zeller and Warnecke 1973). Results of the factor analysis show that, 
although multiple factor loadings can be found, none of the items reliably load onto 
independent factors. Because of this the items of the Zeller and Warnecke scale are 
treated as a single scale with no factor divisions in analysis. However, at times during 
analysis, specific items of interest will be referred to individually. 
The status value scale was created by Shane Thye and is used to rate the status 
value that an object or characteristic possesses (Thye 2000). It is composed of three 
Likert scale items measuring the value, meaningfulness, and honor of an object. Similar 
to the general expectations scale, all items on this scale are rated from 1-7. The scales 
reported alpha was .89. All scales and individual items were completed by the participant 
and were carried out for all actors involved in an interaction. In other words, for the video 
observation section of the study participants filled out the scales and items for the 
observed others, but for the avatar possession and practice interaction part of the study 
participants filled out the items and scales for themselves and their simulated partner. In 
addition to these scales and the single item Likert scales, participants answered a series of 
demographic questions that asked for their age, level of education, approximant income, 
and subjective Social Economic Status. 
Several comprehension checks were used during the study to ensure that 
participants understood the directions given to them, the meaning of the avatars, and what 
happened in prior interactions. The comprehension checks were divided into two sets of 
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5, one set was taken after the first part of the study to make sure that participants 
understood the meaning of the avatars to the study, the rules of interaction during the first 
part of the study, and how scoring worked during the task. The second set was taken after 
participants read directions about the practice rounds to make sure that participants 
understood that they were interacting with a partner, what the procedure was for the 
practice rounds, and that a score was not kept for the practice rounds. 
Two manipulation checks were also included in the experiment. The first 
manipulation check was a series of questions asking about the performance of observed 
actors using the avatars as a form of identification. This check also includes a series of 
questions on the value of the avatars and the participants preferred choice for an avatar in 
the next part of the study if they were allowed to choose. Results of this manipulation 
check show that individuals did interpret performance and value correctly, with over 70% 
correctly identifying the avatar of the higher and lower preforming actor and viewed the 
higher preforming actors’ avatar more valuable (see table 4.2). The majority of 
individuals also chose the higher status avatar as the one they would want in the next 
task, but the variance of responses is greater than what would be expected. However, it 
seems that one of the reasons may have been that individuals found the eye avatar more 
attractive in the mTurk population then in the student population used for the avatar 
norming study. 
The second manipulation check followed the final set of scales and asked 
participants how much of their earnings for the study would they hypothetically be 
willing to give to possess the avatar of their partner. Previous research on status value and 
power has found that if an avatar has higher status value then it will have greater 
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exchange value. In addition to this, individuals are willing to exchange monetary 
resources for a high status valued object, such as a poker chip. I expect this to be true in 
this experiment regardless of the lack of actual exchange. Results from comparisons 
between conditions show that there were no significant differences between what 
participants were willing to exchange for the simulated others avatar, with a sizable 
number of individuals choosing not to propose a hypothetical amount regardless of the 
condition that they were in. This may have been the result of individuals valuing their 
own avatar more than expected, regardless of its high or low status. This explanation is 
expanded on in the discussion. 
Table 4.2 Manipulation Check Results 
 Frequency Percentage 
Correctly chose High 148 77.08 
Correctly chose Low 136 70.83 
Highest Value 132 68.75 
Individual Choice 90 46.88 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS
The sample of mTurk workers that participated in this study are similar to 
samples reported by previous research using the same platform (Berinksy et al. 2012; 
Huff and Tingley 2015). The sample itself is 64% male and a majority of participants 
report their race as white. Most participants report some level of higher education, with 
48% of participants holding a college degree, and another 27% having at least some 
college education. The age of participants ranges from 19 to 70, with a mean of 34 and a 
median of 32. Frequency tables of age, when compared to the median of age, show that 
the upper limits seem to be driven by select outliers. Looking solely at frequency of 
response, most participants were in their late 20s and early to mid 30s. In terms of 
subjective SES and income, most participants made less than $60,000 a year, and 
considered themselves in the middle of the subjective SES scale. More details are 
provided in table 5.1. 
Results from this study can be divided into before and after an avatar is possessed 
by the participant. The analysis of before possession includes a series of t-tests comparing 
the ratings of the high and low status valued avatars and the general performance 
expectations and status of the individuals possessing these objects. Results for after the 
avatar is possessed are mostly composed of a series of One-Way ANOVA’s with   
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Table 5.1 Demographic Summary Statistics 
Variables Count Percentage 
Race   
White 135 70.31% 
Black 27 14.06% 
Hispanic 9 4.69% 
Asian or Pacific Islander 9 4.69% 
Native American 9 4.69% 
Other 3 1.56% 
Sex   
Male 123 64.06% 
Female 68 35.42% 
Other 1 0.52% 
Education   
High School 28 14.66% 
Some College 52 27.23% 
College Graduate 92 48.17% 
Graduate School or Higher 19 9.95% 
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Bonferroni post hoc tests, and a series of regressions models using participants self-
reported demographics as predictors. The One-way ANOVA’s test for differences 
between conditions are followed up by Bonferroni post hoc tests if an ANOVA that had 
significant results. 
Table 5.2 T-test of Status Conferment – General Expectations Scale 
 Obs Mean Std. 
Error 
Std. Deviation  95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lo_Expect 192 37.56 .699 9.69 36.18 38.94 
Hi_Expect 192 46.49 .601 8.33 45.30 47.68 
 
Difference  -8.93 .922  -10.75 -7.12 
 
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff > 0  
 Pr (T < t ) = 
0.000 
Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.000 Pr (T > t ) = 1.000 
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Figure 5.1 Means of General Expectations Scale 
 
Results of the t-tests show that there are significant differences between the means 
of the general expectations scales for the referential actors (P < 0.001, d =0.989). 
However, there are no differences for the Status Value scale and the individual Likert 
items of status, ability, and ability at a similar task. Although all of the individual items in 
the general expectations scale are significant, several are worth taking note of 
individually. Specifically, scale items measuring how much better and able an individual 
is generally expected to be compared to their partner (see description in variables section) 
are of interest. This is because they relate more to the manipulation of specific 
expectations than other items on the scale, providing insight into an individual’s 
perception of performance and specific expectations for the observed task. Both of these 
items were significant at P < 0.001 with an effect size of d = -1.00 for better and d = .785 
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for able. See table 5.2 for a summary table of the t-test and figure 5.1 for a visualization 
of the differences between avatars. 
Table 5.3 One-way ANOVA of General Performance Expectations (Self-Rating of 
Participant) 
Source SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between 
Groups 
231.72 3 77.24 0.96 0.4115 
Within 
Groups 
15085.02 188 80.24   
Total 15316.75 191 80.19   
 
Table 5.4 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for General Performance Expectations (Self-Rating 
of Participant) 
 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 
Condition 2 -0.271   
1.000   
Condition 3 0.625 .895  
0.320 1.00  
Condition 4 2.54 2.81 1.92 
0.997 0.754 1.000 
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Table 5.5 One-way ANOVA of General Performance Expectations (Participant 
ratings of Partner) 
Source SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between 
Groups 
228.97 3 76.32 0.92 0.443 
Within Groups 15630.23 188 83.14   
Total 15859.20 191 83.032   
 
Table 5.6 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for General Performance Expectations (Participant 
ratings of Partner) 
 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 
Condition 2 .625   
1.000   
Condition 3 -2.270 -2.89  
1.000 0.729  
Condition 4 -0.958 -1.583 1.31 
1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
One-way ANOVA’s with Bonferroni post-hoc tests primarily composed the 
analysis of events after the participants possess one of the avatars. These tests compared 
partner’s self-ratings and ratings of their partner on expected performance, status, and 
status value. Self-ratings and partner ratings are analyzed independent of each other, with 
the comparisons focused on differences between conditions. For the general expectations 
scale, there was no difference in either participants’ self-rating and ratings of their 
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partner’s general expectations. In other words, participants did not rate themselves, nor 
their partners general performance expectations in significantly different ways between 
conditions (see tables 5.3 – 5.6). 
Table 5.7 One-way ANOVAs of the Status Value Scale (Self-Rating of Participant) 
Source SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between 
Groups 
216.43 3 72.14 3.54 0.015 
Within Groups 3830.94 188 20.37   
Total 4047.37 191 21.19   
 
Table 5.8 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for Status Value Scale (Self-Rating of Participant) 
 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 
Condition 2 -1.104   
1.000   
Condition 3 1.79 2.89  
0.320 0.012  
Condition 4 .792 1.89 -1 
1.000 0.246 1.000 
 
However, the Status Value scale did show statistically significant differences 
between conditions, specifically when referencing the value of the avatar in possession of 
the participant. When the participant is in possession of the high status avatar, the one 
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previously possessed by a high performing actor, they rate it as having higher status 
value. There are no significant differences found between conditions for the participants 
rating of their partners avatar. This finding is only true for comparisons between 
conditions 2 and 3, in which the status values of the avatars are mismatched. Between 
these conditions, the difference between Status Value scale ratings of the avatar is over a 
point on the Likert scale, and is highly significant (P<.01, d = 2.42) 3. Table 5.7 and 5.8 
provide a summary of this comparison. If items from the Status Value Scale are 
considered individually, they are still found to be significant, with a Bonferroni post-hoc 
test confirming that this significance is again only between the status mismatched 
conditions. The results of this test are not reported but are available by request. 
Table 5.9 One-way ANOVA results for Status (Participant ratings of Partner) 
Source SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between 
Groups 
18.27 3 6.09 2.98 0.0325 
Within Groups 383.708 188 2.04   
Total 401.979 191 2.105   
 
Similar to the Status Value scale, the Likert scale items for rating status and 
ability at a similar task were significantly different when compared between conditions. 
A Bonferroni post-hoc test indicates significance differences are again found between the 
two status mismatched conditions, condition 2 and 3. However, the significance indicated 
by the post-hoc tests is only observed for the ratings of the partner. Participants rated only 
                                                             
3 All significance levels and P-values are calculated using the unstandardized values. 
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their partner as higher status when in possession of the higher status avatar (P < 0.10), 
and as having greater ability at similar tasks (P < 0.01). For the participant themselves, 
there was no effect on how they self-rating in terms of status and ability at a similar task. 
Participants viewed their partner as having status and ability at a similar task when in 
possession of the high status avatar; but the same is not true when the participant is in 
possession of the high status avatar (see tables 5.9-5.12). Other items, such as participant 
and partner ratings of ability, were not significantly difference between conditions. 
Addition measures for perceived luck and control during the task were also insignificant. 
However, the item measuring perceived control had notable differences between the 
means of conditions 2 and 3. This difference was 0.64, but the means for these conditions 
contained a large amount of variance. 
Table 5.10 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for Status Likert Item 
 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 
Condition 2 .6041   
.238   
Condition 3 -.125 -.729  
1.000 0.080  
Condition 4 .479 -.125 .604 
0.612 1.000 .238 
 
                                                             
4 Noticing this difference led me to think that the effect could be present, but I did not have enough power 
to find it. Because of this I did a post-hoc power analysis to find how many participants would be needed to 
obtain significance if the effect is actually present. The results of this analysis showed that I would need to 
run an additional 450 participants in order to gain significance if the effect is actually present. 
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Figure 5.2 Single Likert Items by Condition  
Table 5.11 One-way ANOVA results for Similar Ability (Participant ratings of 
Partner) 
Source SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between 
Groups 
23.35 3 7.78 4.16 0.007 
Within 
Groups 
351.48 188 1.87   
Total 374.82 191 1.96   
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Table 5.12 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for Similar Ability Likert Item 
 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 
Condition 2 .208   
1.000   
Condition 3 -.729 -.9374  
.058 0.006  
Condition 4 -.125 -.3333 .604 
1.000 1.000 0.190 
Although not part of the theory, exploratory analysis using a series of regressions 
was run on the demographics data provided by participants to test of effects of participant 
background and susceptibility to status processes involved in possession of an object. 
Regressions on the general expectations scales, Status Value scale, and individual Likert 
items used the demographics of sex, age, income, and education as independent variables. 
Results from the regressions for participant and partner status value and general 
expectations show education as a significant predictor, increasing general expectations or 
Status Value of an object when it is present. However, no other demographic variables 
are significant in the regression models (see table 5.13). 
Running a reduced model with only education as an independent variable yields 
significant coefficients of .89 for self-reported status value, 1.17 for partner’s status 
value, and 2.38 for partners general expectations. This generally confirms the observation 
above: that as education increases, individuals see avatars as more valuable (see table 
5.14). However, it is not possible to rule out alternative explanations for this effect, such 
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as individuals with a higher education reading and following study directions more 
closely than other participants. 
For participants’ ratings of themselves, status is the only item to have any 
significant predictors. A single predictor, education, is reported as significant, with a 
coefficient of .25. For the participants ratings of the partner, status, ability, and ability at a 
similar task have significant predictors. Status and ability share the significant predictor 
of education, with a coefficient of .365 and .413. Ability at a similar task has two 
significant predictors, education and income. In this model the effect of education is 
significant and positive, with a coefficient of 0.424, and the effect of income is 
significant and negative, with a coefficient of -0.179. Reduced models were run for all of 
these variables. The results show these variables, with the exception of self-ratings of 
status, stay significant. However, there is a notable drop in significance of the coefficients 
and the r-squared for most of the reduced models. This drop is most notable for ratings of 
Status for self and partner (see table 5.13 and 5.14). Although not directly relevant to the 
theory, this exploratory analysis provides insight into future research, particularly for 
understanding how the background of individuals interacts with the process of 
expectation allocation when high status objects are involved. 
 Table 5.13 Regression tables for scales and Single Likert Items (full models) 
 General 
Expectations 
– Self 
General 
Expectations – 
Partner 
Status 
Value – 
Self 
Status 
Value – 
Partner 
Status - 
Self 
Status – 
Partner 
Ability – 
Self 
Ability – 
Partner 
Similar 
Ability – 
Self 
Similar 
Ability 
– 
Partner 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 
10 
Social – 
Economic 
Scale 
.411 (.33) -.151 (.330) -.252 
(.169) 
-.137 
(.171) 
-.04 
(.059) 
-.020 
(.053)  
.045 
(.053) 
-.066 
(.049) 
.104 
(.055) 
-.046 
(.050)  
Sex -.789 (1.33) -.613 (1.32) .104 (.678) -.875 
(.687) 
-.177 
(.234) 
-.086 
(.212)  
-.129 
(.214) 
-.096 
(.197) 
-.043 
(.221)  
-.049 
(.201) 
Age -.022 (.067) .016 (.067) -.005 
(.034) 
.014 
(.035) 
-.017 
(.012) 
-.009 
(.011)  
-.003 
(.011) 
.001 
(.010) 
.0005 
(.011) 
.011 
(.010)  
Education .95 (.781) 2.72 (.778)*** 1.016 
(.400)* 
1.25 
(.404) ** 
.25 
(.14)* 
.365 
(.125)** 
.019 
(.126) 
.413 
(.116) 
*** 
.013 
(.130) 
.432 
(.118) 
*** 
Income .074(.419) -.484 (.419) -.009 
(.214) 
-.013 
(.217)  
.034 
(.075) 
-.108 
(.067) 
-.029 
(.068) 
-.104 
(.062) 
-.051 
(.07) 
-.167 
(.066) 
** 
Intercept 39.20 32.98 10.12 9.44 4.60 4.07 4.66 3.74 4.32 3.35 
R—squared .026 .064 .042 .059 .033 .056 .007 .080 .020 .098 
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 Table 5.14 Regression tables for scales and Single Likert Items (reduced models) 
 General 
Expectations – 
Partner 
Status 
Value 
– Self 
Status 
Value – 
Partner 
Status - 
Self 
Status – 
Partner 
Ability 
– 
Partner 
Similar 
Ability 
– 
Partner 
 Model 2  Model 
3 
Model 4 Model 
5 
Model 6 Model 8 Model 
10 
Education 2.38 (.74) ** .891 
(.380) 
* 
1.17 
(.385) 
** 
.231 
(.133) 
.285 
(.120)* 
.321 
(.112) 
** 
.424 
(.118) 
*** 
Income - - - - - - -.179 
(.058) 
** 
Intercept 31.64 9.37 8.37 3.77 3.47 3.33 3.32 
R—
squared 
.052 .020 .047 .016 .029 .04 .086 
38 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION
In general, I had expected status value to transfer from an individual to an object, 
and then temporarily back to the individual via possession. From this I expected the 
temporarily held status to also increase the general expectations that the individual holds 
for themselves or another in possession of the high status valued object. Instead, 
participants attribute greater performance expectations to the initial individual in 
possession of the object, but they do not seem to immediately gain status value as 
indicated from the status value scale. However, when considering the manipulation 
checks, participants do correctly indicate the status of the high value object and typically 
prefer it to the low value object. Looking past this, when the avatars are possessed by 
participants and their simulated partner we do find large differences in status value, with 
the individual valuing the high status valued object more when they are in possession of 
it. Taking both of these observations together I claim support for the first hypothesis: 
status value is able to transfer from the status of the individuals in the initial interaction to 
the object. However, I would note caution with my support for this hypothesis because 
the increase or decrease in status value does not seem to be successfully conferred to the 
object until it is possessed by others in a new interaction. 
The second hypothesis, that possession of a high status valued object will increase 
an individual’s status during interactions is found to be partially supported. It seems that 
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the reference of who possesses the object in question matters more than previously 
expected. Findings suggest that status only increases when another is in possession of the 
high status valued object. This is the opposite for Status Value, which does not see an 
increase when others are in possession the high status valued object. However, it sees a 
large increase when the individual providing evaluations of the situation is in possession 
of the high status valued object. Again, this only has a significant effect when objects of 
two different status values are involved. This may hint at a cognitive effect on how 
performance is allocated, where when in possession of a high status valued object the 
performance is attributed to the object instead of the individuals. 
The third hypothesis, that possession of a high status valued object will increase 
an individual’s performance expectations, is also partly supported. In general, the trend 
for this hypothesis is the same as hypothesis two, when another possesses the status 
valued object they get a boost in their performance expectations. However, this only 
holds true for specific expectations measured by the ability at a similar task item, not for 
expectations measured by the general expectations scale. 
The most puzzling finding from this study is that individuals see the object as 
possessing greater status value when they are in possession of it, but do not see 
themselves as possessing greater status or ability when in possession. It could be that the 
object is not transferring expectations from the initial interaction to the individual and 
thus doesn’t confer status to them during possession. However, when the simulated 
partner is in possession of the High Status Valued object, they are assumed to have higher 
status and perform better at a similar task, but the status value of their object is not seen 
as greater in comparison. 
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One explanation for this is that there is a difference in the process of allocation of 
value to the object, and status and performance expectations to the individual. When the 
individual possesses the high status value object they assume that it is the object instead 
of their innate ability that is causing their performance. This results in them lowering 
their expectations for themselves when not considering the object. For example, if an 
individual expects to perform better with a specific brand of musical instrument, 
regardless of the actual quality of the instrument, they may attribute positive performance 
expectations to the object instead of themselves. 
There is support for these differences in value resulting from possession from the 
literature on the endowment effect, which states that individuals value an object more 
than those without it simply because they are in possession of it (Kahnemen et al. 1991; 
Morewedge and Giblin 2015). Experiments in economics literature look closer at this 
concept, finding that once an object is given to an individual to possess, they attribute an 
exchange value to it, often which is above the market price of the object (Kahnemen et al. 
1991). This prevents individuals from parting with their endowed object because they 
value it more than what others are willing to exchange for it. However, when asked to 
rate the attractiveness of an object in their possession it’s not see as more attractive than 
its counterpart (Kahnemen et al. 1991). In addition to this interpretation of the 
Endowment Effect, others have proposed that that the effect is actually the result of 
evolutional advantages in situation interpretations (Huck et al. 2005), strategic 
misinterpretation as a bargaining strategy (Kurt and Inman 2013), and bias in processing 
exchange information (Ashby et al. 2012). 
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The endowment effect explains in part why Status Value is not affected when 
another is in possession of the status valued object. Because the experiment was designed 
so that both the participant and their simulated partner possessed an object, a kind of floor 
effect may have been created for the objects value. This could prevent the effects of 
negative status value and expectations associated with the object from being perceived by 
the individual. Future studies in this line of research should try to account for this effect 
by including conditions in which no object is provided to one of the interactants, either 
simulated or otherwise, with the single object being either high or low in status value. 
Although this would change the scope of the theory this study tests, as the study proposes 
to keep objects present for all individuals during their interactions as to keep things 
similar. However, the change in the scope would allow for a measurement of how much 
the endowment effect influences individuals valuation of an object. 
This would also provide the study with more mundane realism because high status 
objects are not always met with a viable lower status alterative. For example, an 
individual possessing a Rolex watch is unlikely to have an interaction with another who 
possess a lower value Rolex, or in many cases, a watch in general. Instead, the Rolex is 
serving as a status valued object with no alternative. Strengthening the claim to a Rolex 
Watch as a status valued object, those with a Rolex may still refer to their smart phone as 
a timekeeper, making the Rolex a part of their outfit instead of an object with utility. 
It is also possible that there is a mismatch between what I measured using the 
general expectations scale and the manipulation. During the observation of previous 
individuals interacting with the avatars a very specific set of characteristics was 
manipulated, ability at a Relational Ability task. However, items that make up the general 
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expectations scale created by Zeller and Warnecke do not include measurements of 
specific expectations, such as ability at a specific variety of task (i.e., writing, pattern 
recognition, woodworking, etc.). Because of this, the scale could be missing the 
expectations being manipulated in the interaction simply by not measuring them. 
This claim has some support from results of the items used to measure ability, 
ability at a similar task, and status. Results from between groups comparisons show that 
participants indicated that when their simulated partner possessed the status valued object 
they were seen as having greater ability at a similar task and higher status in comparison 
to the participant. Participants did not get the same boost when it in possession of a high 
status object. However, they were not asked directly about expectations related to specific 
ability in a scale or series of questions. Instead, we are inferring their specific 
expectations from the single Likert scale item. Other aspects of specific performance 
expectations, such as regular or future performance, and the utility of the item during 
performance, were not accounted for. 
Another explanation for the lack of general expectations transferring is that there 
is not enough status valued added to the object from the one interaction being salient to 
the participant. Because the avatar did not have a long history of possession, it is possible 
that status value had not been adequately conferred to the object because it was not clear 
that the avatar is actually tied to performance. For example, a Stradivarius Violin was not 
inherently given high Status Value from its creation, but it has high Status Value because 
of its association with the Stradivarius family and with other musicians that possessed a 
Stradivarius and performed well. In addition to this, in previous work on Status Value 
44 
 
and power in exchange relationships there were multiple rounds of exchange that 
solidified Status Value of the object via attachment to the individual. 
Future studies are needed to understand this effect and the incrementation that a 
single interaction causes in terms of Status Value versus when multiple interactions are 
known and salient to the individual. For example, future studies could use the same 
situation, and instead of providing the participant with the object after a single 
interaction, the participant could view a diagram of individual interaction in a specific 
order. This diagram could present the interaction sequence and the performance outcomes 
of the interaction, providing participants with a clear understanding of how far away they 
are from the initial interaction, and an understanding of the performance history of those 
in possession of the object. This could also be done as a simple vignette experiment 
providing the same information to the participant as written text, although the 
manipulation would not be as strong as a visual diagram. 
It may also be possible that status value can increase and decrease over time 
depending on the history of possession. For example, if a brand of cookware is given 
high status value via its association with important culinary figures but is then shown to 
be common along a line of very poorly preforming fry cooks it is likely that this will 
lower its value in the eyes of individuals that are aware of its common possession among 
fry cooks. The change in status value via association with high or low status others may 
be a summarizing effect, a sequential effect, or have a curvilinear effect in which once a 
certain amount of status value is reached it is impossible to lose value regardless of the 
individual associated with it. Although there is not much existing research on how this 
mechanism may work, it does fit with existing research on the transfer of performance 
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expectations between situations in experiments (Markovsky et al. 1984) and classrooms 
(Cohen and Lotan 1995). 
Lastly, the relevance of the object to the task could matter more than what was 
previously expected. For example, if the task which an individual performs is an Algebra 
task and the high status avatar is an Abacus, it would be more salient because of the task 
and more important to the individual when they or another possess it. In Thye’s studies 
on status value and exchange value poker chips are used, which already have an 
exchange value salience to them either from gambling or from use in a number of board 
games, and the effects of these studies are stronger and clearer than I find here. 
However, there are similar studies that do not use task meaningful objects and are 
still able to gain significant results. Harkness (2017) studied status spread via association 
with reward states as the object of status value, which is more abstract then the 
possession of an avatar. This study also utilized task ratings of specific ability for the 
partner that were affected by reward level assignment, which provides support for even 
more abstract objects. But it is possible that using the avatar as the status valued object, 
because of its abstractness and lack of connection to the task, resulted in a lesser effect on 
all measures then what would have been observed if an object had clearer relevance.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
At the turn of the 20th century, Veblen proposed that individuals will imitate those 
of higher social classes in order to raise their status (Veblen 1899). In a separate line of 
theory, Frank (1985) proposed that individuals are willing to exchange time and 
resources for association with high status others and groups. Tying these together, Thye 
(2000) proposed and experimentally confirmed the Status Value Theory of Power, which 
claimed that individuals of higher status think of their resources as more valuable and are 
able to exchange their resources for more of a low status other’s resource. However, in all 
of these lines of inquiry the question of whether the possession of a status valued object 
actually increases status was not directly answered. This study makes important first 
steps in answering this question by expanding existing theory and discussing the nature 
of status value outside the standard context of Status Characteristics. 
This study is only able to partly support the proposed extension of the Theory of 
Status Value, finding that status value and expectations only clearly transfer to the other, 
not the self. The results suggest that when individuals are in possession of an object of 
high status value they attribute positive performance to the object instead of themselves, 
increasing its status value. However, when another is in possession of a Status Valued 
Object both status and expectations are attributed to the other. Additional status value is 
not attributed to the object in their possession. This paradoxical outcome needs additional 
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research to be clearly understood. However, several explanations have been put forward 
to explain these findings. The first proposes that there is an unaccounted for process of 
expectation formation in which individuals perform a kind of cognitive dissonance in 
order to explain why they do not possess a status valued object. A second explanation 
proposes that the endowment effect resulted in a floor value for any object that an 
individual possesses. Finally, a third explanation proposes that more than a single 
interaction is needed before status value can clearly be tied to an object. After a series of 
interactions, a threshold effect may take hold, allowing the item to contain status value 
high enough to be transferred to another individual clearly. In addition, a high enough 
status valuation may also adequately confer status to another via a similar process. 
This study is not without its problems and oversights, specifically in 
measurement. During the study specific performance expectations were manipulated. 
However, the scale used to gain information about status expectations was a general 
expectations scale. This mismatch in manipulation and measurement is likely to have 
resulted in lost information on how individuals actually felt and develop evaluations. 
Taking this into account, the measure that did get at specific expectations, performance at 
a similar task, was significant and fits into explanations 1 and 2 proposed in this 
discussion. 
Although there are several scales for measuring general expectations, including 
Zeller and Wernecke’s general expectations scale (Zeller and Wernecke 1973) and 
Ridgeway’s Status and Conscientiousness scale (Ridgeway and Correll 2006), there is not 
an existing scale for measuring specific expectations. Such a scale should be developed 
and incorporated into future studies on status value and object possession in order to 
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adequately measure expectations and further our understanding of how status and 
expectations spread to individuals in possession of Status Valued Objects. 
Overall, this study does provide some answers to the question of “do status valued 
objects spread status.” However, the answers provided are less clear than what was 
hoped, leaving room for future research. Specifically, additional research is needed to 
address which explanation is more likely to explain this study’s observations, and new 
expectations scales are needed in order to clearly get at specific instead of general 
expectations.
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APPENDIX A: FORMAL THEORY MODULE
Terms and Notation Key 
Status (sx): Perceived prestige or honor 
Value: The importance socially assigned to an object 
Object (Rx): an item that can be possessed 
Status Value (vx): type of importance, prestige, or honor attached to an individual 
characteristic or exchangeable resource 
Actor (P, O, J, Q): an individual who participates in an interaction 
Performance Expectations (ex): an actors expected ability at a task  
 
Scope Conditions 
This theory extension will apply under conditions in which (1) at least two 
noticeably different objects are present, (2) actors are differentiated only by the status 
values of the objects they possess, (3) there is a clear and salient difference in ability of 
actors during the first interaction. 
 
Propositions 
The propositions in this theory expansion are divided between two modules. The 
first module explains the interactions of two sets of individuals and their interaction with 
a nominally valued object. The first set of individuals, P & O, are actors in in possession 
of the nominally valued objects. The second set of individuals, J & Q, are observing this 
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interaction. During the second module J and Q are given possession of the status valued 
objects. 
 
Module 1 
Proposition 1: From the perspectives of J and Q, if the performance expectations of P are 
greater than the performance expectations of O, then the status of P will be greater than 
the status of O. 
Actors observing the interaction and noticing the difference in performance on the 
observed task adopt the belief that the status P is greater than the status of O. This is 
derived from assumption 5 of SCT (Berger et all. 1977). 
 
From the perspectives of J and Q !"	$% > 	 $', )ℎ$+	,% > ,' 
 
Proposition 2: If J and Q observe an interaction between P and O where the performance 
expectations for P are greater than performance expectations for O, then the value placed 
on objects in P's possession will be greater than the value placed on objects in O’s 
possession. 
This is derived from assumption 1 of SCT (Berger et al. 1977), the status transfer 
process described in Status Value Theory (Berger and Fisek 2006, 2013), and the 
observation process that is possible with doubly dissimilar encounters (Ridgeway 1991). 
 -"	.	/+0	1	23,$45$	,% > 	 ,', )ℎ$+	567(9%) > 567(9') 
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Module 2 
Proposition 3: If J possesses object NP, and Q possesses object NO, then J and Q will 
assume that these objects indicate status and infer status from these objects. This is 
derived from proposition 2 of the proposed theory and the reverse process of Reward 
Expectations Theory (Berger et al. 19851). 
This proposition requires that objects possessed by J and Q are the same objects 
that were in the interactions taking place during proposition 1 and 2. This requirement 
bridges the two modules via a shared reference for status. 
 -"	.	;2,,$,,$,	9<	/+0	1	;2,,$,,$,	9=, )ℎ$+	.	/+0	1	/,,>?$	,6 > ,7 
 
Proposition 4: If the status value of object NP is greater than the status value of object NO, 
and there are no contrary sources of information, then the status value of the object 
possessed by actor P and actor O will be used to form performance expectations. This is 
derived from proposition 3 of the proposed theory and assumptions 2 and 5 of SCT 
(Berger et al. 1977). 
 -"	,6 > ,7, )ℎ$+	$6 > $7 
 
Derivations 
Derivation 1: If the status value of object Np is greater than the status value of No, then J 
and Q will see P as having greater status then O. This follows from propositions 1 and 2 
from module 1 and assumptions 2 and 5 from SCT (Berger et al. 1977). 
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Derivation 2: If the performance expectations of P over O is greater than 0, then the 
performance expectations of J over Q is also greater than 0. This follows from 
assumptions 1 and 4, showing that the performance expectations based off the initial 
interaction carry over to future interaction with new actors possessing the same status 
valued object. 
 -"	$<= > 0, )ℎ$+	$67 > 0 
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APPENDIX B: GRAPH THEORETIC MODEL 
The figures below illustrate the theory using the graph theoretic model5. I have organized 
the diagrams and explanations into the initial interaction that status value is created 
(figure 3) and the interactions by observers of the initial interaction (figure 4). 
 
Figure B.1 – Initial Interaction 
In the initial interaction 4 actors are present (J,P,O,Q). In figure 3 these actors 
occupy positions of interactors (P,O) and observers (J,Q). The interactants are tied to 
different nominal objects (R+,-) through a possession bond. The objects connect to task 
                                                             
5 The graph theoretic model comes from the book Status Characteristics and Social Interaction (Berger et 
al. 1977) and articles on the Status Value Theory of Power (Thye 2000; Thye and Harrell 2016). I have 
added the observing actors into a graph model based off these two sources. The second model for 
possession of objects by actors who were initially observing the interaction was also based off these 
sources, but more liberties were taking in adapting the model to the theory in this thesis.  
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specific status characteristic (C), which is expected to be instrumental to the task. In the 
case of the initial condition, this is the observed performance between actor’s P and O. 
The specific status characteristic (C) is connected to the task outcome (T) via the 
generalized expectation state (t) and the abstract task ability (Y). In other words, the 
observed ability or a specific characteristic is assumed relevant to a task. It is used to 
reference generalized expectations of those interacting and indicate if they would have 
abilities instrumental to the task. This results in paths of length 5 and 6.  
Over the course of repetitive interaction, the observed performance of P and O 
would cause actors only observing the interaction to infer a connection between the 
individual’s ability and their status in the dyad. Status is then conferred onto the object in 
the interactants possession, giving it status value. This inferred connection is shown in 
figure 3 via the dashed lines. The described process is expected to show similarities to 
Thye and colleagues work on Status Value Theory of Power (Thye 2000, Thye and 
Harrell 2016).  
After the initial interaction creates salient differences in the valuation of objects 
possessed by P and O, they drop out of the interaction and the objects are assigned to the 
observing actors J and Q, creating a possession bond. This changes the graph model by 
removing the specific status characteristic that was present and the dimensionality bond 
that connected the two actors. The dimensionality bond is instead shifted down to the 
generalized expectations state (t), meaning that differences between the two actors are 
based on the generalized expectations they have instead of a specific or diffused 
characteristic. Because there is no characteristic present except for the objects bestowed 
to actors, the status value of these objects will be used to create performance 
 59 
expectations. This adjusted graph model can be seen in figure 4. This results in paths of 
length 4 and 5. The tie between the objects and the characteristics of the actors is shown 
with a dashed line.
 
Figure B.2 – Observers Interaction 
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APPENDIX C: COUNTERBALANCING AVATARS
Counterbalancing of the avatars was done by random assignment in Qualtrics. 
Participants had an equal chance of being assigned version 1 or version 2 of the video. 
The versions were the same in scoring by the referential actors at the meaning insight 
task and in the text and manipulations displayed. The only difference was that version 1 
had the sun avatar as the high status avatar, and version 2 had the aperture avatar as the 
high status avatar, an effect which was created by flipping the avatars in the video. In 
other words, the visual effects that highlighted scoring and the scores remained constant, 
only the avatars were moved between versions to create the counterbalance effect. 
There is no difference found when using t-tests to compare the means of the 
general expectations scale between video version. This illustrates that counterbalancing 
did not have an effect on the general expectations participants had for the individual in 
possession of the high and low status avatars. However, there is a significant effect when 
comparing means of the Status Value Scale, as shown in table C.1 and C.2. It seems that 
in the second version of the video participants rated both the high and low status avatar 
higher during interaction. When comparing the mean of the low value and high value 
avatar within conditions there is no effect (see tables C.3 and C.4). This leads to the 
conclusion that, although there is an effect between videos on how highly avatars were 
rated, there is not video specific effects that would have influenced the results. 
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Table C.1 Video Version Comparison, between videos – Low Status Avatar 
 Obs Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Version 1 96 11.74 .464 4.54 10.82 12.66 
Version 2 96 15.64 .304 2.98 15.03 16.24 
 
Difference  -3.90 .555  -4.99 -2.801 
 
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff > 0 
 
Pr (T < t ) = 
0.000 
Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.000 Pr (T > t ) = 1.000 
 
Table C.2 Video Version Comparison, between videos – High Status Avatar 
 Obs Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lo_Value 96 12.19 .434 4.54 11.33 13.05 
Hi_Value 96 15.19 .369 3.58 14.46 15.91 
 
Difference  -.448 .635  -4.12 -1.88 
 
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff > 0 
 
Pr (T < t ) = 
0.000 
Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.000 Pr (T > t ) = 1.000 
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Table C.3 Video Version Comparison, Version 1 
 Obs Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lo_Value 96 11.74 .463 4.54 10.82 12.66 
Hi_Value 96 12.18 .434 4.25 11.34 13.05 
 
Difference  -.448 .635  -1.700 .805 
 
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff > 0 
 
Pr (T < t ) = 
0.2407 
Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.481 Pr (T > t ) = 0.759 
 
Table C.4 Video Version Comparison, Version 2 
 Obs Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lo_Value 96 15.64 .304 2.98 15.03 16.24 
Hi_Value 96 15.19 .366 3.54 14.46 15.91 
 
Difference  -.448 .476  -.49 1.39 
 
 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff !=0 Ha: diff > 0 
 
Pr (T < t ) = 
0.826 
Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.348 Pr (T > t ) = 0.174 
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APPENDIX D: AVATAR NORMING STUDY
University of South Carolina students rated the attractiveness of a selection of 
avatars in return for extra credit in select courses. A total of 20 participants were recruited 
for the norming study. The age of participants was 19-26, with most being 19. A majority 
of the participants were female. The most common major was nursing, with 5 participants 
claiming it as their major. 
The avatars were found at the website ICONSDB.com 
(https://www.iconsdb.com/). A total of 20 avatars were selected from the website. Each 
participant rated each avatar in terms of their interestingness, value, visual attractiveness, 
and how much that individual would like to be represented by the avatar. All ratings were 
done using a 1 to 5 point Likert scale in which participants claimed agreement or 
disagreement with a statement saying that the avatar was one of the Likert statements. 
The results from the study, some summary statistics, and discussion on avatar selection is 
below. 
General mean comparisons and a one-way ANOVA were carried out to test the 
attractiveness and similarity of the avatars. The ANOVA results are not reported because 
meaningful interpretation of the ANOVAs was difficult due to small sample sizes and 
large standard deviations. Because of this only the means were considered when selecting 
the avatars. 
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In the end, the items measuring how interesting and visibly pleasing avatars were 
used as the metric to decide which avatars to include. The logic behind this was that both 
interesting and attractive avatars would keep participants attention during the study. 
Avatars with the highest and most similar means were selected with the assumption that 
these would be similar enough in attractiveness during day to day interaction as not to 
draw undue attention or preference from participants. In the end, the Aperture, Eye, 
Light, and Sun avatars were chosen. 
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Table D.1 Means and Standard Errors of Avatar 
 Interesting Valuable Pleasing Represent 
2 x 2 cube 2.8 (.26) 2.8 (.22) 3.1 (.24) 2.6 (.23) 
3 x 3 cube 3 (.30) 2.8 (.26) 3.4 (.18) 2.25 (.22) 
Aperture 3.9 (.14) 2.85 (.23) 4.3 (.16) 2.9 (.22) 
Basket 3.05 (.26) 3.2 (.24) 2.9 (.25) 2.35 (.21) 
Beaker 3.25 (.20) 3.6 (.18) 3.25 (.18) 2.8 (.23) 
Bolt 3.6 (.21) 3.55 (.20) 3.4 (.20) 3.3 (.26) 
Bug 3.5 (.24) 2.9 (.20) 3.35 (.21) 2.4 (.26) 
Compass 3.45 (.23) 3.5 (.20) 3.25 (.18) 2.65 (.21) 
Crescent 3.3 (.27) 3.3 (.22) 3.8 (.17) 3.3 (.21) 
Eye 3.75 (.19) 3.6 (.18) 3.3 (.23) 2.65 (.24) 
Flag 2.8 (.21) 2.95 (.18) 2.75 (.22) 2.65 (.23) 
Flame 3.45 (.22) 3.15 (.20) 3.25 (.20) 3 (.21) 
HF Circle 2.7 (.23) 2.8 (.22) 3.2 (.20) 2.55 (.26) 
Light 3.9 (.18) 3.2 (.21) 3.5 (.18) 3.15 (.21) 
Planet 3.75 (.22) 3.65 (.20) 3.55 (.26) 3.5 (.20) 
Puzzle 3.35 (.21) 3.35 (.18) 3.45 (.20) 3.7 (22) 
Signpost 3.15 (.21) 3.15 (.17) 2.75 (.16) 2.35 (.15) 
Star 3.2 (.28) 3.5 (.24) 3.75 (.22) 3.35 (.25) 
Sun 3.95 (.18) 3.05 (.18) 4.1 (.19) 3.85 (.21) 
 
